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A Country in Crisis: The Changing Demographics of Japan 
Katherine Ziomek
I. Introduction
The current rhetoric regarding Japan’s demographics is that the country is facing 
a crisis. Since WW II, the Japanese birth rate has been falling, and there are fears 
that the Japanese population is aging without replacement. This crisis is, however, 
the result of traditional Japanese values and perspectives on  marriage, women, 
child-bearing, and immigration. Although the current demographic crisis raises 
concerns about the future of the ethnic Japanese population, it is important to dis-
cuss and acknowledge the ways in which Japanese society created the conditions 
for this crisis to take place.
 I begin with a statement about the scope of this paper regarding con-
ceptions of gender and limitations of research. Next I outline the current state 
of demographics in Japan. Additionally, since low birth rates and increasing life 
expectancy are resulting in an aging population, I examine the current and future 
implications of an aging population in Japan, including the physical and finan-
cial vulnerability of the elderly. Then, I discuss reasons for the changing demo-
graphics of Japan, including the status of women, perspectives toward working 
wives and mothers, and the changing field of employment in Japan. Finally, I 
explore some solutions to the demographic crisis that have been recommended or 
attempted, and I finish by supporting one potential solution: immigration reform. 
i. Limitations of research 
 
In this paper, I discuss marriage and child-bearing in Japan. This discussion is lim-
ited in scope, given that I focus on cisgender females and cisgender males, terms 
that describe individuals who identify with the gender they were assigned at birth. 
Another limitation is that the statements and research presented in the newspaper 
articles and peer-reviewed journal articles that I consulted for this paper focus on 
cisgender heterosexual relationships. Although Japan is becoming more tolerant of 
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the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning (LGBTQ) commu-
nity, same-sex marriage has not yet been legalized (Tai), and as such, discussions 
of child-bearing are limited to heterosexual relationships. I would recommend that 
further research be conducted on the relationship between the Japanese LGBTQ 
community and beliefs regarding child-bearing, birth rates, the demographic crisis, 
and concerns regarding the growing elderly population. Additionally, using data 
from the World Bank Group, I constructed graphs to illustrate how the demograph-
ics in Japan are changing. However, when separating data by “gender,” the World 
Bank Group does not include specifications other than “male” or “female,” which 
tend to refer to cisnormative gender identities. The fact that this data does not 
acknowledge non-cisgender identities represents a limitation in the research and a 
potential bias in the data collection, yet I will retain the binary terminology in order 
to maintain consistency and facilitate replicability.
 
II. Demographics in Japan
In Japan, the average household size decreased from 4.8 members to 2.4 members 
between 1920 and 2010 with a decrease of 5% occurring between 2005 and 2010 
(Schröder et al. 761, 762). In addition, since 2005, the death rate in Japan has been 
greater than the birth rate, which has resulted in a demographic crisis for the country 
(Schieder 15). Since the birth rate is lower than the death rate, concerns regarding 
population replacement and population growth are understandably high. Projections 
suggest that by 2060, the Japanese population will decrease from 127 million to 87 
million (“Why the Japanese Are Having So Few Babies”). 
 Utilizing data compiled by the World Bank Group, I created the graphs in 
the Appendixes that demonstrate pertinent demographic trends in Japan.1  The graph 
in Appendix A shows the decreasing birth rate in relation to the death rate in Japan. 
Since the mid-1970s, the crude birth rate (defined as the birth rate per 1000 people) 
has been decreasing while the crude death rate (defined as the death rate per 1000 
people) has a U-shaped trend, steadily increasing since the 1980s. While both rates 
fluctuate, since 2007 the crude death rate has been higher than the crude birth rate, 
with the difference between the two rates becoming more pronounced (the World 
Bank Group). 
 Appendix B, combined with Appendix C and Appendix D, provides an 
accurate picture of changing population patterns in Japan. The graph in Appendix 
B demonstrates the percentage of the population aged sixty-five and above in Japan. 
In 2013, the percentage of Japanese aged sixty-five and above hit 25% and contin-
ues to increase, reaching 25.41% in 2014 (the World Bank Group). The first year 
1. I have previously done research on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster and included graphs cre-
ated using data from the World Bank Group, which included data up to the year 2012 or 2013, depending on the indicators. 
The graphs present in this paper are updated versions with data to 2014 for all indicators discussed in this paper.
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with data available in the World Bank Group’s data is 1960, and the percentage of 
the elderly population in Japan was 5.73% in that year. It is clear that there was a 
pronounced increase in the percentage of Japanese aged sixty-five and above from 
1960 to 2014 and that a very different population structure exists in Japan today 
than in previous years. 
 Appendix C provides additional insight into the percentage of Japanese 
society that survives until age sixty-five grouped by “male” and “female.” Since 
1960, the percentage of both males and females that reach the age of sixty-five 
has increased. In 2014, 94.01% of females lived until age sixty-five and 88.04% 
of males lived until age sixty-five (the World Bank Group). Thus, in Japan, an 
increasing percentage of individuals are aged sixty-five and over in any given 
year. In addition, Appendix D depicts the increasing life expectancy of Japanese 
individuals. These trends illustrate that the life expectancy of males, females, 
and the total population is increasing.2  In 2014, life expectancy at birth reached 
86.83, 80.5, and 83.59 for females, males, and the total population respectively 
(the World Bank Group). In sum, these statistics illustrate the following trends in 
Japan’s demographics: the crude birth rate is decreasing and the crude death rate 
is increasing. Additionally, the percentage of the total population that is sixty-five 
and above is increasing, the share of the total population living to sixty-five and 
above is increasing, and the life expectancy for Japanese individuals is increasing. 
i. Implications of an Aging Population
In Japan, there are several factors that result in an aging population. First, the birth 
rate is declining. Second, the life expectancy in Japan is increasing incrementally. 
One implication of an aging population is a larger financial burden on younger 
generations in Japan due to the costs associated with maintaining elder healthcare 
and pension payments (Schieder 15). 
 During the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami disaster, one 
major implication of an aging population became clear, namely an increased vul-
nerability to natural disasters. Given that Japan experiences approximately 1,000 
tremors each year and is prone to earthquakes (Cyranoski 392), the percentage of the 
Japanese population that is vulnerable to earthquake and tsunami-related negative 
health outcomes will increase. In the 2011 disaster, there were estimates of over 
20,000 deaths (Lay and Kanamori 33), and “65% of the dead were over 60 years 
old” (UNESCO and IOC 3). Additionally, elderly individuals are more vulnerable 
to negative health outcomes, and following the disaster, the elderly population 
specifically was affected by influenza A (H3N2) (Kamigaki et al. 2, 6), pneumonia 
2. A notable exception is the visible “dip” in the graph. This dip represents the year 2011, which was when the Great East 
Japan Earthquake occurred.
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(4), mental illness (Matanle 837), and trauma in farming communities as a result of 
being forced to evacuate land that was passed down through generations (Sugimoto 
et al. 630). 
 Another aspect of the elderly population’s vulnerability to disasters is a 
lack of mobility. Mobility was a concern in this disaster, given that such a high 
percentage of the total deaths were among those aged sixty and over, 92.5% of 
these deaths being drowning related (Matanle 836–837). Given that Japan is 
prone to earthquakes, the increasing vulnerability of an aging population evokes 
compassion and concern for the well-being of the elderly, with additional con-
cerns regarding the financial costs of an aging population. Since the aggregate 
number of elderly individuals is increasing, the result will be greater financial 
costs to the state and taxpayers who will have to pay for the healthcare of elderly 
individuals following disasters and trauma. That being said, this acknowledge-
ment is not intended to further victimize or to blame the elderly for their vulnera-
bility during times of disaster; it is important to recognize all of the implications 
of the demographic crisis, including financial implications.
III. Reasons for Demographic Change
i. Japanese women as wives and mothers 
In Japan, there is a traditional idea of what life looks like: “male-breadwinner– 
female-homemaker” (Piotrowski et al. 1040). Increasingly, however, Japanese indi-
viduals are choosing to delay or postpone marriage. In 2010, 60.3% of women aged 
25–29 had never married (Fukuda 107). One reason why many Japanese individuals 
choose to delay or opt out of marriage is due to financial considerations (“Why the 
Japanese Are Having So Few Babies”). In Japan, weddings are expensive—costing 
3.2 million yen, or 40,000 dollars, on average (“The dearth of births”). Because 
of cultural norms, having children out of wedlock in Japan is extremely rare, and 
therefore the declining rate of marriage is related to the declining birth rate. Since 
the rate of marriage is declining, there is a subsequent decline in total births—only 
about 2% of total births occur outside of wedlock (Fukuda 108; “Why the Japanese 
Are Having So Few Babies”).
 In Japan, when a woman is in the workforce and then becomes a mother, 
she faces difficulties in both her work and personal life. In their article, Cooper 
and Hagiwara recount several interviews they conducted with Japanese women 
who described their lived experiences as women who have had to choose between 
childbearing and their careers. One Japanese woman, Terue Suzuki, described her 
experience as a working wife and mother after having children. Suzuki explained, 
4
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“I had a satisfying job and really wanted to go back to it. In Japanese society, 
when a woman chooses work instead of staying at home to look after her husband, 
she’s called a devil wife” (Cooper and Hagiwara). The lived experience of another 
Japanese woman, Yoko Ogata, provides insight into several layers of traditional 
Japanese attitudes toward women, marriage, childbearing, careers, and how they 
impact Japanese women. Ogata stated, “I wanted to have kids but I kept putting it 
off because I wanted to gain recognition for my work.” Additionally, Ogata married 
a co-worker, but “colleagues told her to ‘be a good wife,’ while others told her hus-
band he ‘shouldn’t make his wife continue working’” (Cooper and Hagiwara). At 
the age of thirty-six, a time when she was being given a great deal of responsibility 
and control at work, Ogata became pregnant and experienced a miscarriage. She 
stated, “my husband and mother-in-law were very angry and asked if I hadn’t had a 
miscarriage on purpose.” Following this, Ogata and her husband divorced (Cooper 
and Hagiwara). Unfortunately, these perspectives toward working women in Japan 
are not rare. In 2010, a survey of 6,000 Japanese couples found that “70 percent 
of respondents said mothers should stop working when their children are small to 
focus on raising them” (Cooper and Hagiwara). As these statistics illustrates, the 
opinion that women cannot simultaneously be mothers and have careers is common 
in Japan, providing a social obstacle for Japanese women.
ii. Working in Japan  
The availability of work and the changing expectations of workers in Japan also 
has had an impact on the country’s demographics. The Japanese have created the 
expression “freeter,” which refers to “part-time workers between the ages of 15 
and 34, not students, and not married if female” (Cook 36; Piotrowski et al. 1040). 
The number of “freeters” in Japan has increased since the 1990s, with the ratio of 
irregular to regular employees being 22.1% in 2012 for males (Cook 36). According 
to Japanese society, “freeters” can be described as follows: 
… layabout youths who lack a work ethic and shirk their responsibilities to 
the nation … victims of the changing employment market and long recession 
… and contributors to the demographic woes that Japan is facing through 
their limited social welfare contributions and their low rate of marriage. (37) 
In Japan, research suggests that male “freeters,” or irregular employees, marry less, 
as they “have difficulty maintaining long-term romantic relations and transitioning 
from dating to marriage, in part because of their irregular employment status and 
ZIOMEK
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low breadwinning ability” (Cook 37). Additionally, research suggests that males 
working in temporary or non-regular jobs are “more likely to postpone marriage” 
(Piotrowski et al. 1040). The trouble with temporary or non-regular jobs is their 
lack of permanence. 
 In the post–WW II period in Japan, the conception of work was called a 
“standard employment relationship,” which was a permanent, full-time job with 
benefits (1040). In Japan, the relationship between a male “breadwinner” and female 
“homemaker” assumes that standard employment is a given, especially since some 
companies in Japan used to provide lifetime employment and guarantees of promo-
tion, ensuring that workers’ families were cared for (1040). This is no longer the 
case in Japan. Neo-liberal economic influences changed the nature of employment 
in Japan. While the Japanese economy was suffering in the early 1990s, compa-
nies began to focus on cost reduction, and social insurance made it cheaper to hire 
non-regular workers instead of regular workers. Furthermore, in the 2000s, Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi began to deregulate the Japanese economy following 
the models from the Thatcher–Reagan era (1041). Currently, non-regular workers 
account for “over one third of the entire workforce, or more than 20 million work-
ers” (1041). As a result, neo-liberal social and economic policies affected a signif-
icant proportion of the Japanese population, and these policies played a large part 
in creating the conditions for the current demographic crisis. There is an empirical 
relationship between a non-regular male worker in Japan and a diminished likeli-
hood of marriage (1051). Importantly, temporary work is becoming a permanent 
part of the Japanese lived experience since it “has a stigmatizing and negative effect 
on the acquisition of future employment as a regular worker,” and the majority of 
temporary workers are young or middle-aged males (1041).
 Another outcome of the current situation of temporary workers in Japan is 
the phenomenon of “parasite singles.” In 2004, Masahiro Yamada described “par-
asite singles” as single, adult individuals who continue living with their parents for 
an extended period of time due to economic constraints such as working part-time 
jobs (Schieder 17, 18).3  In Japan, there is a cultural expectation that children are 
the responsibility of their parents, and once the parents become elders, the care-
taking responsibility shifts to the children (Fukuda 108). However, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for Japanese youth to transition into permanent work that can 
cover the cost of a wedding or independent living because of job insecurity and 
the lack of opportunities for good-paying jobs (Fukuda 108). As a result, a greater 
number of young Japanese individuals continue to live with their parents well into 
adulthood.
  
3. It is important to note that while “parasite singles” can be female or male, the term has been used to criticize single 
women in Japan, and the term can also be used to mean a woman “rejecting the austerity of marriage and children, prefer-
ring conspicuous consumption” (Schieder 15). 
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 It is important to acknowledge difficulties that women face in the traditional 
Japanese workplace. Since many Japanese companies hire university graduates with 
the expectation of permanent, lifelong employment, Japanese women face difficul-
ties making progress in their careers if they take a break to have children (“Holding 
Back Half the Nation”).  In Japan, women have a labour-force participation rate 
of 63%. Additionally, 70% of Japanese women do not work for a decade or more 
after the birth of their first child and many never return to work at all, so there is a 
concern that the potential of Japanese women is being neglected (“Holding Back 
Half the Nation”). However, societal concern over unused female brain power is 
hardly new. Writing in the 19th century, Mill stated that increased equality between 
women and men would ultimately benefit society:
[There would be a] doubling [of] the mass of mental faculties available for 
the higher service of humanity. Where there is now one person qualified to 
benefit mankind and promote the general improvement, as a public teacher, 
or an administrator of some branch of public or social affairs, there would 
then be a chance of two. (81)
Mill acknowledged that integrating and supporting women more effectively in 
the workforce would be to the benefit of all. Unfortunately, many of the inequal-
ities Mill identified remain major issues for Japanese women in the 21st century, 
effectively resulting in the underutilization of half of the population. Given the 
many difficulties the Japanese population will face as its demographics shift, 
this failure to embrace working women is especially problematic. There are sev-
eral potential solutions to this crisis, which I explore in the following section, 
but if Japan truly wishes to address the future challenges posed by the demo-
graphic shift, then improving the status of women in Japan must be a priority. 
    
IV. Possible Solutions to Demographic Change
The demographic crisis is clearly affecting various sectors of Japanese society and 
evokes concern and emotion from government officials. At this point, it is important 
to ask the following question: How can the Japanese government encourage pos-
itive population growth in non-invasive and socially beneficial ways? Previously, 
the Japanese government has used different strategies to try to increase the birth 
rate “including a ‘women’s handbook’ to educate young females on the high and 
low points of their fertility, and state-sponsored matchmaking events” (“Why the 
Japanese Are Having So Few Babies”). Additionally, the government has invested 
ZIOMEK
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in child benefits and daycare centres; however, these strategies have not been suc-
cessful (“The dearth of births”). In this section, I discuss some of these strategies 
as well as some other potentially viable strategies that the Japanese government 
may consider.
 As stated by Mill, women who are forced to not work or forced to choose 
not to work are a large source of unutilized potential in society. Thus, a recent 
strategy proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzō Abe, is promising. In 
response to a shrinking birth rate combined with a shrinking economy, Abe has 
implemented his “Abenomics” growth strategy (“Holding Back Half the Nation”). 
This strategy attempts to bring awareness and practical solutions to the issue of 
how women are viewed in Japan, and his speeches cover topics including operating 
hours of kindergartens and breastfeeding when outside the home (“Holding Back 
Half the Nation”). With this strategy, Abe’s goal is not only for more women to 
work but also for women to be more successful in their careers. For example, “by 
2020 Mr. Abe wants women to occupy 30% of all ‘leadership’ positions—which 
would include members of parliament, heads of local government and corporate 
executives” (“Holding Back Half the Nation”). Moreover, Wingfield-Hayes (2013) 
writes that Abe’s strategy stands a good chance of succeeding:
Evidence from Europe and America suggest helping women to stay in work 
can increase the birth rate. In countries like Sweden, Denmark and the US, 
where female employment rates are high, birth rates are also higher. In coun-
tries where female employment is low, like Italy, South Korea and Japan, 
birth rates are also low.
 
Since the goal is ultimately to increase the birth rate in Japan, evidence suggests 
that improving the status of working women in Japan will have a positive impact 
on this goal. Thus, bringing awareness to the struggles Japanese women face and 
helping them maintain their working status regardless of their family structures 
will help to increase the birth rate. Unfortunately, being a woman who has a family, 
raises children, and builds a career is not currently accommodated in the structure 
of Japanese society. Cooper and Hagiwara (2012) write that in Japan, there are only 
166 childcare places per 10,000 people, as compared to 2010 in the UK and 365 in 
Australia, making childcare scarcity another barrier for working Japanese women. 
The Japanese women who fight through social disapproval and wish to continue 
working after having children may struggle to do so because of the low number of 
daycare centres, the long waiting lists, and the high cost (Wingfield-Hayes). One 
practical solution that Abe has implemented “has been to try to shorten waiting lists 
8
Laurier Undergraduate Journal of the Arts, Vol. 4 [2017], Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/luja/vol4/iss1/6
41
for child care by allowing more private companies into a previously state-dominated 
sector” (“Holding Back Half the Nation”). Increasing the number of daycares avail-
able and thereby allowing more children into daycare will eliminate this barrier for 
many mothers who wish to continue working. It is possible that eventually some 
women in Japan will choose to become working mothers if they have superior 
childcare options available to them.
 One possible solution to the demographic crisis is immigration reform. 
Immigration reform is a complicated issue for an ethnically homogenous nation 
like Japan, and consequently many oppose this idea (Wohns 6). Recently there 
has been political support for this reformation, including the 2008 proposal from 
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party “to increase the number of immigrants to 10% 
of the population” (Wohns 6). Even so, Japan currently has immigration policies 
that still favour those who are ethnically Japanese (Carens 181). However, consid-
ering that Japan is experiencing a demographic crisis with a shrinking birth rate 
and an increasing life expectancy, the Japanese government may have to consider 
reforming its immigration policies and welcoming people who are not ethnically 
Japanese. 
 While the concern over a shrinking birth rate is valid, we must pause to 
consider whether the concern in Japan is really over the shrinking total birth rate 
or whether it is for the global decline of an ethnically Japanese population. When 
polled, 65% of the Japanese population stated that they would reject immigration 
reform, and this desire to maintain ethnic homogeneity “often manifests itself in 
xenophobia” (Wohns 6, 7). Immigration reform may alleviate some difficulties in 
Japan’s future, such as the financial difficulty of supporting a growing elderly pop-
ulation. However, increased immigration to Japan from many different countries 
around the world may also lead to difficult societal discussions regarding tradi-
tional Japanese attitudes toward heterosexuality, marriage, the “male-breadwinner– 
female-homemaker” mentality, and beliefs regarding births outside of wedlock. 
Given these potential issues, the government’s top priority should be to support 
and empower Japanese women in their career and family choices with immigration 
reform as a secondary solution.
V. Conclusion
Japan is experiencing a demographic crisis in which the birth rate is decreasing 
while the population is aging. These demographic changes are as a result of social 
issues in Japan, such as the societal pressure on women to leave work once they 
marry or become mothers. Additionally, Japanese individuals face increasing finan-
ZIOMEK
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cial difficulties in following the traditional Japanese lifestyle of “male-breadwinner– 
female-homemaker,” which results in decreasing marriage rates. Even if the decline 
of the ethnic Japanese population can be slowed by immigration, the status of 
Japanese women must be improved regardless of whether they are or not (or wish 
to be) mothers. As Wingfield-Hayes states, “women who are having children are 
not working. Women who are working are not having children. Both are terrible 
for Japan’s future.” Thus, improving the status of women in Japan will improve 
the country’s demographic crisis, and perhaps in the future Japanese women who 
choose to have both a career and children will not be termed “Devil Wives.”
Appendices
Appendix A:
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